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Abstract 
This paper contends that Pierre Trudeau’s 1969 “White 
Paper” on the status of  Aboriginals in Canada was not a major 
turning point in improving the status of  Aboriginals in Canada, but 
succeeded in inspiring activism and interest in the plight of  Canada’s 
First Nations. The policy attempted to redefine the Canadian 
government’s relationship with its Aboriginal peoples, expressing the 
centrality of  the government in Aboriginal affairs and reinforcing its 
obliviousness to the needs of  Canada’s First Nations. The White 
Paper proposed to remove “Indian Status” for Aboriginals, and as a 
result was vehemently rejected. The effects of  the proposed 
revocation of  Status Indians persisted through the social activism and 
awareness that it inspired. This paper traces the development British-
Aboriginal relations following the fall of  New France. Diplomacy and 
treaty-making in the prelude to the White Paper will be considered, 
along with the changing conception of  “Indian Status” throughout 
Canadian history. Thus, this paper argues that although the White 
Paper was a necessary step in the realization of  the dire condition of  
Aboriginals in Canada, it did not provoke any lasting government 
policies that recognized absolute Aboriginal rights and liberties. 
 
Keywords: White Paper, Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal land claims, 
Canadian History, Canadian-Aboriginal relations 
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First Nations land rights in Canada have been called into question 
since European settlers first reached North America. Territorial 
cessions and disputes pervaded centuries of  French and British 
dominion, and coincided with Canadian confederation. From the 
British Royal Proclamation of  1763 to the present day, pervasive 
tensions and disagreements have shaped interactions between First 
Nations and European colonists. In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau and his Minister of  Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, released 
the “Statement of  the Government of  Canada on Indian Policy.” 
Colloquially known as the “White Paper,” the policy document was 
the culmination of  a century of  mismanaged relations between the 
Government of  Canada and the First Nations. The White Paper was 
intended to redefine the Canadian Government's relationship with 
the First Nations. The Paper affirmed the centrality of  the federal 
government in Aboriginal affairs, revoking “Indian status” while 
claiming to prevent discrimination against First Nations peoples.1 
However, intense backlash from the First Nations immediately 
following the White Paper’s release prompted the Canadian 
Government to reject it as unfeasible. As a result, the White Paper 
was not a major turning point in the struggle for Aboriginal rights 
and land claims in Canada. Rather, it was a singular event in the 
continued plight of Canada’s First Nations. By understanding Pierre 
Trudeau’s White Paper as a catalyst for the expansion of public 
awareness of the social and legal struggles faced by Canada’s First 
Nations, it becomes apparent that the 1969 White Paper initiated an 
improvement in First Nations activism and advocacy, but not 
tangible change in government policy. The historical significance of 
the White Paper resonates with present-day supporters of First 
Nations rights and land claims in Canada. Understanding the origins 
of and reactions to the 1969 White Paper can help to reveal nuances 
                                                 
1  Jean Chrétien, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy,” 
Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to the First Session of the 
Twenty-Eighth Parliament. 1969. 
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of the First Nations’ continued struggle for recognition. 
 
Formal diplomatic relations between the British and First Nations 
began with the 1763 British Royal Proclamation. The Proclamation 
declared that relations between the Crown and First Nations would 
be on a nation-to-nation basis.2 This stipulation recognized the 
autonomy of  the First Nations as a distinct diplomatic power. 
Treaties were made under the doctrine of  terra nullis, “nobody’s land;” 
unoccupied land that was free for the taking and was not subject to 
the sovereignty of  a recognized state. Contemporary European 
perceptions of  international law stated that full title could be 
acquired through conquest; however, the Crown chose to pursue land 
cessions through treaty and agreement.3 The First Nations were thus 
considered independent of  the Crown when relations were 
established.4  
 
In his work A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, Gordon Gibson 
outlines two key patterns of  diplomacy adopted by the British 
Crown: nation-to-nation and collective treatment rather than 
individual treatment.5 The Crown favoured the latter principle of  
collective treatment, signifying that the First Nations were regarded 
as undeserving of  dignified treatment as individuals in legal matters. 
Therefore, the Crown’s perception of  the First Nations as a 
“nuisance to colonization” was the basis for land cessions.6 Policies 
that promoted isolation were convenient for keeping the First 
Nations out of  consideration until the 1960s.7 In addition, a court 
decision of  the Judicial Committee of  the Privy Council, in the 1888 
case St. Catherine’s Milling v. The Queen, determined that First Nations’ 
                                                 
2 Gordon Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy: Respect the 
Collective, Promote the Individual (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2009), 34.  
3 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 35. 
4 A-G. Gagnon, "Canada: Unity and Diversity," Parliamentary Affairs 53, no. 
1 (2000): 14. 
5 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 36. 
6 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 36. 
7    Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 38. 
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title to land was only allowed at the Crown’s discretion. This 
presupposed that the First Nations peoples were not civilized enough 
to have inherent land-ownership rights, and as such did not have legal 
ownership of  the land upon which they lived. St. Catherine's Milling set 
a precedent for land rights that denied the First Nations land 
ownership on the basis that they did not have the same conception 
of  land ownership as the British Crown. This discrepancy continued 
to be exploited by the Crown, and later by the Canadian government, 
in First Nations land rights legislation.8 
 
The British North America Act of  1867 further complicated First 
Nations land rights. The constitutional settlement of  Confederation 
did not recognize the First Nations as a founding nation of  Canada, 
even though they had previously been treated as an independent 
nation.9 The Act effectively made the First Nations wards of  the state 
stripping them of  their autonomy and intrinsic rights.10 Moreover, 
section 91 of  the Act delegated former colonial power to the 
centralized Canadian government. “Indians and land reserved for 
Indians” were now completely under state control, terminating the 
diplomatic relationship between the Crown and First Nations.11 
Gibson asserts that the incorporation of  discrimination and racism 
into basic Canadian law was the foundation for our contemporary 
splintered “parallel society.”12 According to Gibson, these 
discriminating and demeaning policies set the foundation for public 
disagreements about the nature of  First Nations rights and land 
claims.  
 The 1876 Indian Act and the 1880 Indian Act further justified 
the marginalization of  Aboriginal peoples within Canadian society 
                                                 
8 Peter Kulchyski, “The Violence of the Letter: Land Claims and Continuing 
Colonial Conquest in Canada,” Canadian Dimension 41, no. 1 (2007): 20.  
9 Gagnon, “Canada: Unity and Diversity,” 13. 
10 Karen Virag, “A “Disatrous Mistake”: A Brief History of Residential 
Schools,” ATA Magazine 86, no. 2 (2005), 19. 
11 United Kingdom. Parliament of the United Kingdom. The British North 
America Act of 1867, Enactment no. 1. Section 91 (24). 1867. 
12 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 39. 
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and legislation. These Acts abolished self-government and placed 
finance, social services, and education under federal control.13 
Furthermore, Aboriginal peoples’ right to mobility was curtailed; 
individuals were assigned to bands, which were in turn assigned to 
reserves. In this way, the Indian Act imposed a majoritarian democracy 
upon minorities while strengthening the executive branch of  
government.14 The Department of  Indian Affairs was created to 
implement new Aboriginal policy and deal with the so-called “Indian 
Problem.”15 This prompted the creation of  residential schools, which 
promoted assimilation by reinforcing the English or French language 
and the Christian religious tradition. Federal policies removed the 
autonomy of  the Aboriginals in treaty-making and self-government, 
effectively preventing them from becoming either Canadian citizens 
or a separate nation.16 By the turn of  the twentieth century, First 
Nations rights had been completely overshadowed by the motives of  
the Canadian state.  
 
The deplorable conditions of  Aboriginal rights and freedoms 
remained relatively consistent and unchallenged until the return of  
First Nations soldiers after the Second World War. Aboriginal 
servicemen began to question their treatment by Canadian society, 
especially regarding the colonization of  the First Nations’ traditional 
lands.17 The 1950s and 1960s saw increasing public awareness but 
little political activism, as social and legal inequities became more 
apparent to both Canadians and First Nations. The formation of  
First Nations activist groups, such as the Federation of  Saskatchewan 
Indians in 1961 and the National Indian Brotherhood in 1968, 
demonstrated the growing demand for recognition and action on 
                                                 
13 Virag, “A Disastrous Mistake,” 19. 
14 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 41. 
15 Virag, “A “Disastrous Mistake,” 19. 
16 Virag, “A “Disastrous Mistake,” 19. 
17 Howard Ramos, “Opportunity for Whom?: Political Opportunity and Critical 
Events in Canadian Aboriginal Mobilization, 1951-2000,” Social Forces 87, 
no. 2 (2008), 800. 
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behalf  of  Canadian First Nations. 18 The 1966 Hawthorn 
Commission was established to further investigate the social position 
of  the First Nations in Canadian Society. The Survey of  the 
Contemporary Indians of  Canada was submitted to the Minister of  
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and indicated the 
government’s refusal to assimilate the First Nations. However, this 
policy was contradicted by the Commission’s recommendation that 
Natives leave their reserves to seek a place in the wider Canadian 
economy.19 Hawthorn further recommended spending large amounts 
of  money to obtain minimum standards of  living on reserves, but 
stipulated that the burden be pushed onto provinces in order to 
encourage integration into society.20 The report coined the term 
“citizens plus,” emphasizing exorbitant expenditures on Aboriginal 
peoples as reparations for decades of  neglect under the Canadian 
system and to ensure the preservation of  their separate identity.21 The 
Commission was not fully implemented because its recommendations 
were so costly, but it was integral in providing the initial framework 
for the 1969 White Paper. The paper offered a distinct vision of  how 
to integrate Aboriginals into wider Canadian society, though it 
maintained the notion of  a special citizenship.  
 
Given the heightened interest in Aboriginal affairs, Pierre Trudeau 
and his Minister of  Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, produced the 1969 
White Paper. Trudeau’s vision of  a “just society” that valued 
individual liberty and freedom of  opportunity as the cornerstone of  
the policy. In addition, Trudeau viewed the special legal provision of  
“citizens plus” as discriminatory towards both Natives and 
Canadians.22 The White Paper stipulated a six-point plan for change. 
                                                 
18 Virag, “A Disastrous Mistake,” 19. 
19 Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2000), 179. 
20 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 44. 
21 Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, 179;  James Frideres and René 
R. Gadacz. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts, 6th ed., 
(Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 2001), 319. 
22 Gagnon, “Canada: Unity and Diversity,” 17. 
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It recommended that legislative and constitutional bases of  
discrimination be removed, and that there be popular recognition of  
the contribution of  First Nations culture to Canadian life. In 
addition, the paper recommended that services be provided through 
the same channels and government agencies for all Canadians, and 
that those who are furthest behind be helped the most. Moreover, it 
reinforced that lawful obligations towards all Canadians be 
recognized, including control of  First Nations land being transferred 
to the traditional inhabitants.23 The White Paper also proposed three 
possible courses of  action: continuation of  reserves, assimilation, or 
a “full role in Canadian society and in the economy while retaining, 
strengthening and developing an Indian identity which preserves the 
good things of  the past and helps Indian people to prosper and 
thrive.”24 In effect, the White Paper would eliminate the legal status 
of  “Indian” in an aim to equalize all Canadians, although it explicitly 
rejected the idea of  assimilation. 
   
The White Paper invoked an inflammatory response from the First 
Nations peoples across Canada. Harold Cardinal, a Cree activist, 
published The Unjust Society in response. Cardinal denounced the 
White Paper as “no better than cultural genocide,” and a “thinly 
disguised programme of  extermination through assimilation.”25 To 
Canada’s First Nations, the White Paper implied that reserves and 
treaties recognizing First Nations rights would be terminated.26 This 
directly threatened the livelihood of  the First Nations of  Canada by 
revoking access to their traditional lands. In effect, the White Paper 
would rescind promises of  First Nations autonomy made both by the 
British Crown and Canadian government. The White Paper was 
rejected because of  its blatant disregard for the interests of  the First 
Nations, even though they had participated in research and 
                                                 
23 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 46. 
24 Chrétien, “Statement of the Government of Canada,” 1969. 
25 Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians, 
(Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969) 1. 
26 Gagnon, “Canada: Unity and Diversity,” 18. 
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consultation.27 In addition, the White Paper ignored the Hawthorn 
Commission’s recommendations on the topic of  special rights.28 The 
First Nations regarded the White Paper as offensive in its glaring 
disregard for their rights, compromising what was intended by the 
government to be a gesture of  reparation and progress. The White 
Paper itself  did not advance policy-making on Aboriginal rights; on 
the contrary, it ignited fierce backlash and controversy. 
 
The chiefs of  Canada argued that Trudeau had failed to provide for 
those First Nations who simply wanted to continue living under the 
old system and preserve their traditional lands and culture.29 Harold 
Cardinal led the publication of  “The Red Paper,” or Citizens Plus, a 
satirical response to the White Paper on behalf  of  the First Nations 
leaders in Alberta. In the document, Cardinal and the Indian Chiefs 
of  Alberta advocated for a return to the original treaty relationship 
and the idea that the First Nations of  Canada have additional rights 
compared to other Canadians.30 Media interest grew, creating unity 
among the First Nations and piquing the sympathies of  many other 
Canadians. When Trudeau finally abandoned the White Paper due to 
public backlash in 1971, the “evolving process of  gradual 
improvement in Indian affairs” was abated by the abrupt and forceful 
attempt to make progress.31 In his article “The New Indian Wars,” 
Les Sillars argues that the consequences of  not accepting the White 
Paper have been “costly and tragic…32 Now [the First Nations 
peoples] blame their leaders, not segregation, for their suffering – the 
continual denial of  the need for radical reform only prolongs the 
                                                 
27 Sally M. Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” in Making 
Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70, (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1981), 173. 
28 Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” 173. 
29 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 47. 
30 Indian Association of Alberta, Citizens Plus. 
31 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 47.  
32 Les Sillars, “The New Indian Wars: Trudeau's Repudiated Integrationist 1969 
White Paper May Still Offer the Only                                              Hope for the 
Strife-torn Reserves of 1997,” Alberta Report 24, no. 45 (1997): 6. 
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government's denial of  basic rights and freedoms.”33 These 
conflicting viewpoints argue for the same principle in starkly 
contrasting ways, illustrating two perspectives of  a devastatingly 
complex issue with a single desired outcome.  
 
Though the general negativity toward the White Paper abated after it 
was rejected, a desire for progress resonated among the First Nations. 
Tom Flanagan argues in his work First Nations? Second Thoughts that it 
created a “new era in Native politics.” Flanagan contends that the 
White Paper introduced the themes that would prevail in future 
policy and activism. Aboriginal rights, land claims, and self-
government replaced the older concerns of  the war on poverty and 
the notion of  “citizens plus.”34 According to S. M. Weaver, the White 
Paper became the “single most powerful catalyst in the Indian 
nationalist movement,” which gave First Nations cause to reaffirm 
their heritage and identity while organizing against the government.35 
The White Paper provoked discussion and debate about the meaning 
of  citizenship and the nature of  Canadian federalism. Gibson 
highlights that the immediate response by the federal government 
was to send money and responsibilities to the First Nations’ 
independent band governments to avoid future liabilities related to 
activism. As a result, authority and responsibility became more 
difficult to trace as the development of  First Nations policy passed to 
the courts.36 The complexity of  the issue in both was emphasized as 
First Nations and non-First Nations activists became engaged. The 
White Paper was thus a turning point in activism on behalf  of  First 
Nations rights, though it failed to produce a lasting change in policy-
making. 
 
The ramifications of  the White Paper legitimized First Nations rights 
and claims, though there was inconsistency in government policy. As 
the social and political movement gained momentum, the First 
                                                 
33 Sillars, “The New Indian Wars,” 8. 
34 Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts,180. 
35 Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” 171. 
36 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 48. 
Kerr 59 
 
Nations took up more lawsuits against the federal and provincial 
governments of  Canada. In Calder v. Attorney-General of BC (1973), the 
Nisga'a people nearly won a declaration of ownership of the Nass 
Valley in British Columbia, on the grounds that there were no formal 
treaties that ceded land ownership.37 The treaty system was 
modernized in 1974 when the Office of Native Claims was created as 
a joint venture between the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development and the National Indian Brotherhood.38 To 
this day, treaties are still arranged such that no rights or title exist 
independent of the agreement. As a result, more First Nations 
peoples see modern treaties as a method of reasserting their 
continuing ownership of traditional territories.39 This regressive 
policy discounts the agency and autonomous rights of the First 
Nations. Such technicalities exacerbate tensions and inhibit 
productive and progressive legislation, which would advance the 
struggle for aboriginal rights and land claims.  
 
Though the White Paper was a necessary step in realizing the 
condition of First Nations in Canada, it did not provoke any lasting 
government policies that recognized their rights and liberties. Since 
the British Royal Proclamation, there has been no significant 
legislative reform. First Nations activism reached a turning point with 
the release of the 1969 White Paper, beyond which the struggle 
became more public and widely legitimized. The government’s 
lacklustre response reflects an apathetic First Nations policy that 
stems from necessity, rather than a desire for justice. Progress 
towards acknowledging the need for change has been diminished by 
inadequate policy-making. Therefore, while the White Paper 
produced meaningful activism for First Nations rights, the lack of 
policy change to match the demand for rights has ultimately 
trivialized the First Nations’ struggle for equity and justice. 
 
                                                 
37 Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 48. 
38 Frideres and Gadacz. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 320. 
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